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Abstract
There are now several large scale deployments of differential privacy used to col-
lect statistical information about users. However, these deployments periodically
recollect the data and recompute the statistics using algorithms designed for a sin-
gle use. As a result, these systems do not provide meaningful privacy guarantees
over long time scales. Moreover, existing techniques to mitigate this effect do not
apply in the “local model” of differential privacy that these systems use.
In this paper, we introduce a new technique for local differential privacy that
makes it possible to maintain up-to-date statistics over time, with privacy guar-
antees that degrade only in the number of changes in the underlying distribution
rather than the number of collection periods. We use our technique for tracking a
changing statistic in the setting where users are partitioned into an unknown col-
lection of groups, and at every time period each user draws a single bit from a
common (but changing) group-specific distribution. We also provide an applica-
tion to frequency and heavy-hitter estimation.
1 Introduction
After over a decade of research, differential privacy [12] is moving from theory to practice, with
notable deployments by Google [15, 6], Apple [2], Microsoft [10], and the U.S. Census Bureau [1].
These deployments have revealed gaps between existing theory and the needs of practitioners. For
example, the bulk of the differential privacy literature has focused on the central model, in which
user data is collected by a trusted aggregator who performs and publishes the results of a differ-
entially private computation [11]. However, Google, Apple, and Microsoft have instead chosen to
operate in the local model [15, 6, 2, 10], where users individually randomize their data on their own
devices and send it to a potentially untrusted aggregator for analysis [18]. In addition, the academic
literature has largely focused on algorithms for performing one-time computations, like estimating
many statistical quantities [7, 22, 16] or training a classifier [18, 9, 4]. Industrial applications, how-
ever have focused on tracking statistics about a user population, like the set of most frequently used
emojis or words [2]. These statistics evolve over time and so must be re-computed periodically.
Together, the two problems of periodically recomputing a population statistic and operating in the lo-
cal model pose a challenge. Naïvely repeating a differentially private computation causes the privacy
loss to degrade as the square root of the number of recomputations, quickly leading to enormous val-
ues of ǫ. This naïve strategy is what is used in practice [15, 6, 2]. As a result, Tang et al. [23] discov-
ered that the privacy parameters guaranteed by Apple’s implementation of differentially private data
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collection can become unreasonably large even in relatively short time periods.1 Published research
on Google and Microsoft’s deployments suggests that they encounter similar issues [15, 6, 10].
On inspection the naïve strategy of regular statistical updates seems wasteful as aggregate population
statistics don’t change very frequently—we expect that the most frequently visited website today
will typically be the same as it was yesterday. However, population statistics do eventually change,
and if we only recompute them infrequently, then we can be too slow to notice these changes.
The central model of differential privacy allows for an elegant solution to this problem. For large
classes of statistics, we can use the sparse vector technique [13, 22, 16, 11] to repeatedly perform
computations on a dataset such that the error required for a fixed privacy level grows not with
the number of recomputations, but with the number of times the computation’s outcome changes
significantly. For statistics that are relatively stable over time, this technique dramatically reduces
the overall error. Unfortunately, the sparse vector technique provably has no local analogue [18, 24].
In this paper we present a technique that makes it possible to repeatedly recompute a statistic with
error that decays with the number of times the statistic changes significantly, rather than the num-
ber of times we recompute the current value of the statistic, all while satisfying local differential
privacy. This technique allows for tracking of evolving local data in a way that makes it possible
to quickly detect changes, at modest cost, so long as those changes are relatively infrequent. Our
approach guarantees privacy under any conditions, and obtains good accuracy by leveraging three as-
sumptions: (1) each user’s data comes from one ofm evolving distributions; (2), these distributions
change relatively infrequently; and (3) users collect a certain amount of data during each reporting
period, which we term an epoch. By varying the lengths of the epochs (for example, collecting re-
ports hourly, daily, or weekly), we can trade off more frequent reports versus improved privacy and
accuracy.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
Although our techniques are rather general, we first focus our attention on the problem of privately
estimating the average of bits, with one bit held by each user. This simple problem is widely appli-
cable because most algorithms in the local model have the following structure: on each individual’s
device, data records are translated into a short bit vector using sketching or hashing techniques. The
bits in this vector are perturbed to ensure privacy using a technique called randomized response, and
the perturbed vector is then sent to a server for analysis. The server collects the perturbed vectors,
averages them, and produces a data structure encoding some interesting statistical information about
the users as a whole. Thus many algorithms (for example, those based on statistical queries) can be
implemented using just the simple primitive of estimating the average of bits.
We analyze our algorithm in the following probabilistic model (see Section 3 for a formal descrip-
tion). The population of n users has an unknown partition into subgroups, each of which has size
at least L, time proceeds in rounds, and in each round each user samples a private bit independently
from their subgroup-specific distribution. The private data for each user consists of the vector of
bits sampled across rounds, and our goal is to track the total population mean over time. We require
that the estimate be private, and ask for the strong (and widely known) notion of local differential
privacy—for every user, no matter how other users or the server behave, the distribution of the
messages sent by that user should not depend significantly on that user’s private data.
To circumvent the limits of local differential privacy, we consider a slightly relaxed estimation guar-
antee. Specifically, we batch the rounds into T epochs, each consisting of ℓ rounds, and aim in
each epoch t to estimate pt, the population-wide mean across the subgroups and rounds of epoch t.
Thus, any sufficiently large changes in this mean will be identified after the current epoch completes,
which we think of as introducing a small “delay".
Our main result is an algorithm that takes data generated according to our model, guarantees a fixed
level of local privacy ε that grows (up to a certain point) with the number of distributional changes
rather than the number of epochs, and guarantees that the estimates released at the end of each
epoch are accurate up to error that scales sublinearly in 1/ℓ and only polylogarithmically with the
total number of epochs T . Our method improves over the naïve solution of simply recomputing the
1Although the value of ǫ that Apple guarantees over the course of say, a week, is not meaningful on its own,
Apple does take additional heuristic steps (as does Google) that make it difficult to combine user data from
multiple data collections [2, 15, 6]. Thus, they may still provide a strong, if heuristic, privacy guarantee.
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statistic every epoch – which would lead to either privacy parameter or error that scales linearly with
the number of epochs—and offers a quantifiable way to reason about the interaction of collection
times, reporting frequency, and accuracy. We note that one can alternatively phrase our algorithm
so as to have a fixed error guarantee, and a privacy cost that scales dynamically with the number of
times the distribution changes2.
Theorem 1.1 (Protocol for Bernoulli Means, Informal Version of Theorem 4.3). In the above model,
there is an ε-differentially private local protocol that achieves the following guarantee: with proba-
bility at least 1−δ, while the total number of elapsed epochs t where some subgroup distribution has
changed is fewer than ε ⋅min( L√
n ln(mT /δ) , ln(T )√nℓ ), the protocol outputs estimates p˜t where
∣p˜t − pt∣ = O⎛⎝ln(T )
√
ln(nT /δ)
ℓ
⎞⎠
where L is the smallest subgroup size, n is the number of users, ℓ is the chosen epoch length, and T
is the resulting number of epochs.
To interpret the theorem, consider the setting where there is only one subgroup and L = n. Then
to achieve error α we need, ignoring log factors, ℓ ≥ 1/α2 and that fewer than εα√n changes have
occured. We emphasize that our algorithm satisfies ε-differential privacy for all inputs without a
distributional assumption—only accuracy relies on distributional assumptions.
Finally, we demonstrate the versatility of our method as a basic building block in the design of
locally differentially private algorithms for evolving data by applying it to the well-known heavy
hitters problem. We do so by implementing a protocol due to [3] on top of our simple primitive.
This adapted protocol enables us to efficiently track the evolution of histograms rather than single
bits. Given a setting in which each user in each round independently draws an object from a discrete
distribution over a dictionary of d elements, we demonstrate how to maintain a frequency oracle
(a computationally efficient representation of a histogram) for that dictionary with accuracy guaran-
tees that degrade with the number of times the distribution over the dictionary changes, and only
polylogarithmically with the number of rounds. We summarize this result below.
Theorem 1.2 (Protocol for Heavy-Hitters, Informal Version of Theorem 5.2). In the above model,
there is an ε-differentially private local protocol that achieves the following guarantee: with prob-
ability at least 1 − δ, while the total number of elapsed epochs t where some subgroup distribution
has changed is fewer than ε ⋅min( L√
n ln(mT /δ) , ln(T )√n ln(nT /δ)ℓ ) the protocol outputs estimate
oracles fˆ t such that for all v ∈ [d]
∣fˆ t(v) −Pt(v)∣ = O⎛⎝ln(T )
√
ln(nT /δ)
ℓ
+√ ln(2dnT /δ)
n
⎞⎠ .
where n is the number of users, L is the smallest subgroup size, Pt is the mean distribution over
dictionary elements in epoch t, d is the number of dictionary elements, ℓ is the chosen epoch length,
and T is the resulting number of epochs.
1.2 Related Work
The problem of privacy loss for persistent local statistics has been recognized since at least the
original work of Erlingsson et al. [15] on RAPPOR (the first large-scale deployment of differential
privacy in the local model). Erlingsson et al. [15] offers a heuristic memoization technique that
impedes a certain straightforward attack but does not prevent the differential privacy loss from accu-
mulating linearly in the number of times the protocol is run. Ding et al. [10] give a formal analysis of
a similar memoization technique, but the resulting guarantee is not differential privacy—instead it is
a privacy guarantee that depends on the behavior of other users, and may offer no protection to users
with idiosyncratic device usage. In contrast, we give a worst-case differential privacy guarantee.
Our goal of maintaining a persistent statistical estimate is similar in spirit to the model of privacy
under continual observationDwork et al. [14]. The canonical problem for differential privacy under
2We can achieve a dynamic, data-dependent privacy guarantee using the notion of ex-post differential pri-
vacy [19], for example by using a so-called privacy odometer [21].
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continual observation is to maintain a running count of a stream of bits. However, the problem we
study is quite different. In the continual observation model, new users are arriving, while existing
users’ data does not change. In our model each user receives new information in each round. (Also,
we work in the local model, which has not been the focus of the work on continual observation.)
The local model was originally introduced by Kasiviswanathan et al. [18], and the canonical algorith-
mic task performed in this model has become frequency estimation (and heavy hitters estimation).
This problem has been studied in a series of theoretical [17, 3, 5, 8, 2] and practical works [15, 6, 2].
2 Local Differential Privacy
We require that our algorithms satisfy local differential privacy. Informally, differential privacy is
a property of an algorithm A, and states that the distribution of the output of A is insensitive to
changes in one individual user’s input. Formally, for every pair of inputs x,x′ differing on at most
one user’s data, and every set of possible outputs Z , P [A(x) ∈ Z] ≤ eε ⋅ P [A(x′) ∈ Z]. A locally
differentially private algorithm is one in which each user i applies a private algorithm Ai only to
their data.
Most local protocols are non-interactive: each user i sends a single message that is indepen-
dent of all other messages. Non-interactive protocols can thus be written as A(x1, . . . , xn) =
f(A1(x1), . . . ,An(xn)) for some function f , where each algorithm Ai satisfies ε-differential pri-
vacy. Our model requires an interactive protocol: each user i sends several messages over time, and
these may depend on the messages sent by other users. This necessitates a slightly more complex
formalism.
We consider interactive protocols among the n users and an additional center. Each user runs an
algorithm Ai (possibly taking a private input xi) and the central party runs an algorithm C. We let
the random variable tr(A1, . . . ,An,C) denote the transcript containing all the messages sent by all
of the parties. For a given party i and a set of algorithms A′−i,C′, we let tri(xi;A′−i,C′) denote the
messages sent by user i in the transcript tr(Ai(xi),A′−i,C′). As a shorthand we will write tri(xi),
since A′−i,C′ will be clear from context. We say that the protocol is locally differentially private if
the function tri(xi) is differentially private for every user i and every (possibly malicious) A′−i,C′.
Definition 2.1. An interactive protocol (A1, . . . ,An,C) satisfies ε-local differential privacy if for
every user i, every pair of inputs xi, x
′
i for user i, and every set of algorithms A
′−i,C′, the resulting
algorithm tri(xi) = tri(Ai(xi),A′−i,C′) is ε-differentially private. That is, for every set of possible
outputs Z , P [tri(xi) ∈ Z] ≤ eε ⋅ P [tri(x′i) ∈ Z].
3 Overview: The THRESH Algorithm
Here we present our main algorithm, THRESH. The algorithmic framework is quite general, but
for this high level overview we focus on the simplest setting where the data is Bernoulli. In Sec-
tion 4 we formally present the algorithm for the Bernoulli case and analyze the algorithm to prove
Theorem 1.1.
To explain the algorithm we first recall the distributional model. There are n users, each of whom
belongs to a subgroup Sj for some j ∈ [m]; denote user i’s subgroup by g(i). There are R = T ℓ
rounds divided into T epochs of length ℓ, denotedE1, . . . ,ET . In each round r, each user i receives
a private bit xri ∼ Ber(µrg(i)). We define the population-widemean by µr = 1n(∣S1∣µr1+. . .+∣Sm∣µrm).
For each epoch t, we use pt to denote the average of the Bernoulli means during epoch t, pt =
1
ℓ ∑r∈Et µr. After every epoch t, our protocol outputs p˜t such that ∣pt − p˜t∣ is small.
The goal of THRESH is to maintain some public global estimate p˜t of pt. After any epoch t, we
can update this global estimate p˜t using randomized response: each user submits some differentially
private estimate of the mean of their data, and the center aggregates these responses to obtain p˜t.
The main idea of THRESH is therefore to update the global estimate only when it might become
sufficiently inaccurate, and thus take advantage of the possibly small number of changes in the
underlying statistic pt. The challenge is to privately identify when to update the global estimate.
The Voting Protocol. We identify these “update needed” epochs through a voting protocol. Users
will examine their data and privately publish a vote for whether they believe the global estimate
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needs to be updated. If enough users vote to update the global estimate, we do so (using randomized
response). The challenge for the voting protocol is that users must use randomization in their voting
process, to keep their data private, so we can only detect when a large number of users vote to
update.
First, we describe a naïve voting protocol. In each epoch t, each user i computes a binary vote ati.
This vote is 1 if the user concludes from their own samples that the global estimate p˜t−1 is inaccurate,
and 0 otherwise. Each user casts a noisy vote using randomized response accordingly, and if the sum
of the noisy votes is large enough then a global update occurs.
The problem with this protocol is that small changes in the underlying mean pt may cause some
users to vote 1 and others to vote 0, and this might continue for an arbitrarily long time without
inducing a global update. As a result, each voter “wastes" privacy in every epoch, which is what we
wanted to avoid. We resolve this issue by having voters also estimate their confidence that a global
update needs to occur, and vote proportionally. As a result, voters who have high confidence will
lose more privacy per epoch (but the need for a global update will be detected quickly), while voters
with low confidence will lose privacy more slowly (but may end up voting for many rounds).
In more detail, each user i decides their confidence level by comparing ∣pˆt − pˆf(t)i ∣—the difference
between the local average of their data in the current epoch and their local average the last time a
global update occurred—to a small set of discrete thresholds. Users with the highest confidence will
vote in every epoch, whereas users with lower confidence will only vote in a small subset of the
epochs. We construct these thresholds and subsets so that in expectation no user votes in more than
a constant number of epochs before a global update occurs, and the amount of privacy each user
loses from voting will not grow with the number of epochs required before an update occurs.
4 THRESH: The Bernoulli Case
4.1 The THRESH Algorithm (Bernoulli Case)
We now present pseudocode for the algorithm THRESH, including both the general framework
as well as the specific voting and randomized response procedures. We emphasize that the al-
gorithm only touches user data through the subroutines VOTE, and EST, each of which accesses
data from a single user in at most two epochs. Thus, it is an online local protocol in which user
i’s response in epoch t depends only on user i’s data from at most two epochs t and t′ (and
the global information that is viewable to all users). THRESH uses carefully chosen thresholds
τb = 2(b+ 1)√ln(12nT /δ)/2ℓ for b = −1,0, . . . , ⌊log(T )⌋ to discretize the confidence of each user;
see Section 4.2 for details on this choice.
We begin with a privacy guarantee for THRESH. Our proof uses the standard analysis of the privacy
properties of randomized response, combined with the fact that users have a cap on the number of
updates that prevents the privacy loss from accumulating. We remark that our privacy proof does
not depend on distributional assumptions, which are only used for the proof of accuracy. We sketch
a proof here. A full proof appears in Section 6 of the Appendix.
Theorem 4.1. The protocol THRESH satisfies ε-local differential privacy (Definition 2.1)
Proof Sketch: Naïvely applying composition would yield a privacy parameter that scales with T .
Instead, we will rely on our defined privacy “caps" cVi and c
E
i that limit the number of truthful votes
and estimates each user sends. Intuitively, each user sends at most O( ε
a
+ ε
b
) messages that depend
on their private data, and the rest are sampled independently of their private data. Thus, we need
only bound the privacy “cost" of each of theseO( ε
a
+ ε
b
) elements of a user’s transcript coming from
a different distribution and bound the sum of the costs by ε. ◻
4.2 Accuracy Guarantee
Our accuracy theorem needs the following assumption on L, the size of the smallest subgroup, to
guarantee that a global update occurs whenever any subgroup has all of its member users vote “yes".
Assumption 4.2. L > ( 3√
2
+ √32
ε
)√n ln(12mT /δ).
This brings us to our accuracy theorem, followed by a proof sketch (see Appendix 7 for full details).
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Algorithm 1 Global Algorithm: THRESH
Require: number of users n, number of epochs T , minimum subgroup size L, number of subgroups
m, epoch length ℓ, privacy parameter ε, failure parameter δ
1: Initialize global estimate p˜0 ← −1
2: Initialize vote privacy counters cV1 , . . . , c
V
n ← 0, . . . ,0
3: Initialize estimate privacy counters cE1 , . . . , c
E
n ← 0, . . . ,0
4: Initialize vote noise level a← 4√2n ln(12mT /δ)
L− 3√
2
√
n ln(12mT /δ)
5: Initialize estimate noise level b← √2 ln(12T /δ)/2n
log(T )√ln(12nT /δ)/2ℓ−√ln(12T /δ)/2n
6: for each epoch t ∈ [T ] do
7: for each user i ∈ [n] do
8: User i publishes ati ← VOTE(i, t)
9: end for
10: GlobalUpdatet ← ( 1
n ∑ni=1 ati > 1ea+1 +√ ln(10T /δ)2n )
11: if GlobalUpdatet then
12: f(t) ← t
13: for each i ∈ [n] do
14: User i publishes p˜ti ← EST(i, t)
15: end for
16: Aggregate user estimates into global estimate: p˜t ← 1
n ∑ni=1 p˜ti(eb+1)−1eb−1
17: else
18: f(t) ← f(t − 1)
19: for each i ∈ [n] do
20: User i publishes p˜ti ← Ber( 1eb+1)
21: end for
22: p˜t ← p˜t−1
23: end if
24: Analyst publishes p˜t
25: end for
Algorithm 2 Local Subroutine: VOTE
Require: user i, epoch t
1: Compute local estimate pˆti ← 1ℓ ∑r∈Et xri
2: b∗ ← highest b such that ∣pˆti − pˆf(t)i ∣ > τb
3: VoteYesti ← (cVi < ε/4 and 2⌊logT ⌋−b∗ divides t)
4: if VoteYesti then
5: cVi ← cVi + a
6: ati ← Ber( eaea+1)
7: else
8: ati ← Ber( 1ea+1)
9: end if
10: Output ati
Algorithm 3 Local Subroutine: EST
Require: user i, epoch t
1: SendEstimateti ← {cEi < ε/4}
2: if SendEstimateti then
3: cEi ← cEi + b
4: p˜ti ← Ber( 1+pˆti(eb−1)eb+1 )
5: else
6: p˜ti ← Ber( 1eb+1)
7: end if
8: Output p˜ti
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Theorem 4.3. Given number of users n, number of subgroupsm, smallest subgroup size L, number
of rounds R, privacy parameter ε, and chosen epoch length ℓ and number of epochs T = R/ℓ, with
probability at least 1 − δ, in every epoch t ∈ [T ] such that fewer than
ε
4
⋅min⎛⎝ L8√2n ln(12mT /δ) − 1, 1√2 [log(T )
√
n
ℓ
− 1]⎞⎠
changes have occurred in epochs 1,2, . . . , t, THRESH outputs p˜t such that
∣p˜t − pt∣ ≤ 4(⌊log(T )⌋ + 2)√ ln(12nT /δ)
2ℓ
.
Proof Sketch: We begin by proving correctness of the voting process. Lemma 7.1 guarantees that
if every user decides that their subgroup distribution has not changed then a global update does not
occur, while Lemma 7.2 guarantees that if every user in some subgroup decides that a change has
occurred, then a global update occurs. By Lemma 7.3, for each user i the individual user estimates
driving these voting decisions are themselves accurate to within tℓ = O(√ln(nT /δ)/ℓ) of the true
µt
g(i). Finally, by Lemma 7.4 guarantees that if every user decides that a change has occurred, then
a global update occurs that produces a global estimate p˜t that is within tℓ of the true pt.
To reason about how distribution changes across multiple epochs affect THRESH, we use the pre-
ceding results to show that the number of global updates never exceeds the number of distribution
changes (Lemma 7.6). A more granular guarantee then bounds the number of changes any user
detects—and the number of times they vote accordingly—as a function of the number of distri-
bution changes (Lemma 7.7). These results enable us, in Lemma 7.8, to show that each change
increases a user’s vote privacy cap cVi by at most 2 and estimate privacy cap c
E
i by at most 1.
Finally, recall that THRESH has each user i compare their current local estimate pˆti to their local
estimate in the last global update, pˆf(t)i , to decide how to vote, with higher thresholds for ∣pˆti − pˆf(t)i ∣
increasing the likelihood of a “yes" vote. This implies that if every user in some subgroup computes
a local estimate pˆti such that ∣pˆti − pˆf(t)i ∣ exceeds the highest threshold, then every user sends a “yes"
vote and a global update occurs, bringing with it the accuracy guarantee of Lemma 7.4. In turn, we
conclude that ∣p˜t − pt∣ never exceeds the highest threshold, and our accuracy result follows. ◻
We conclude this section with a few remarks about THRESH. First, while the provided guarantee
depends on the number of changes of any size, one can easily modify THRESH to be robust to
changes of size ≤ c, paying and additive c term in the accuracy. Second, the accuracy’s dependence
on ℓ offers guidance for its selection: roughly, for desired accuracy α, one should set ℓ = 1/α2.
Finally, in practice one may want to periodically assess howmany users have exhausted their privacy
budgets, which we can achieve by extending the voting protocol to estimate the fraction of “live”
users. We primarily view this as an implementation detail outside of the scope of the exact problem
we study.
5 An Application to Heavy Hitters
We now use the methods developed above to obtain similar guarantees for a common problem in
local differential privacy known as heavy hitters. In this problem each of n users has their own
dictionary value v ∈ D (e.g. their homepage), and an aggregator wants to learn the most frequently
held dictionary values (e.g. the most common homepages), known as “heavy hitters", while sat-
isfying local differential privacy for each user. The heavy hitters problem has attracted significant
attention [20, 17, 5, 8]. Here, we show how our techniques combine with an approach of Bassily and
Smith [3] to obtain the first guarantees for heavy hitters on evolving data. We note that our focus on
this approach is primarily for expositional clarity; our techniques should apply just as well to other
variants, which can lead to more efficient algorithms.
5.1 Setting Overview
As in the simpler Bernoulli case, we divide time into ℓ ⋅T rounds and T epochs. Here, in each round
r each user i draws a sample vri from a subgroup-specific distribution Prg(i) over the d values in
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dictionaryD and track P1, . . . ,PT , the weighted average dictionary distribution in each epoch. We
will require the same Assumption 4.2 as in the Bernoulli case, and we also suppose that d ≫ n, a
common parameter regime for this problem.
In the Bernoulli case users could reason about the evolution of µtj directly from their own ℓ samples
in each epoch. Since it is reasonable to assume d≫ ℓ, this is no longer possible in our new setting—Ptj is too large an object to estimate from ℓ samples. However, we can instead adopt a common
approach in heavy hitters estimation and examine a “smaller" object using a hash on dictionary
samples. We will therefore have users reason about the distribution ptj over hashes that Ptj induces,
which is a much smaller joint distribution of m (transformed) Bernoulli distributions. Our hope is
that users can reliably “detect changes” by analyzing ptj , and the feasibility of this method leans
crucially on the properties of the hash in question.
5.2 Details and Privacy Guarantee
First we recall the details of the one-shot protocol from Bassily and Smith [3]. In their protocol,
each user starts with a dictionary value v ∈ [d] with an associated basis vector ev ∈ Rd. The user
hashes this to a smaller vector h ∈ Rw using a (population-wide) Φ, a w × d Johnson-Lindenstrauss
matrix where w ≪ d. The user then passes this hash zˆti = Φev to their own local randomizerR, and
the center aggregates these randomized values into a single z¯ which induces a frequency oracle.
We will modify this to produce a protocol HEAVYTHRESH in the vein of THRESH. In each epoch t
each user i computes an estimated histogram pˆti and then hashes it into Φpˆ
t
i ∈ R
w, where w = 20n
(we assume the existence of a subroutine GenProj for generating Φ). Each user votes on whether or
not a global update has occurred by comparing Φpˆti to their estimate during the most recent update,
Φpˆ
f(t)
i , in HEAVYVOTE. Next, HEAVYTHRESH aggregates these votes to determine whether or
not a global update will occur. Depending on the result, each user then calls their own estimation
subroutine HEAVYEST and outputs a randomized response using R accordingly. If a global update
occurs, HEAVYTHRESH aggregates these responses into a new published global hash y˜t; if not,
HEAVYTHRESH publishes y˜t−1. In either case, HEAVYTHRESH publishes (Φ, y˜t) as well. This
final output is a frequency oracle, which for any v ∈ [d] offers an estimate ⟨Φev, y˜t⟩ of Pt(v).
HEAVYTHRESH will use the following thresholds with τb = 2(b + 1)√2 ln(16wnT /δ)/wℓ for b =−1,0, . . . , ⌊log(T )⌋. See Section 5.3 for details on this choice. Fortunately, the bulk of our analysis
uses tools already developed either in Section 4 or Bassily and Smith [3]. Our privacy guarantee
is almost immediate: since HEAVYTHRESH shares its voting protocols with THRESH, the only
additional analysis needed is for the estimation randomizerR (Lemma 8.1). Using the privacy ofR,
privacy for HEAVYTHRESH follows by the same proof as for the Bernoulli case.
Theorem 5.1. HEAVYTHRESH is ǫ-local differentially private.
5.3 Accuracy Guarantee
As above, an accuracy guarantee for HEAVYTHRESH unfolds along similar lines as that for THRESH,
with additional recourse to results from Bassily and Smith [3]. We again require Assumption 4.2
and also assume d = 2o(n2/ℓ) (a weak assumption made primarily for neatness in Theorem 1.2). Our
result and its proof sketch follow, with details and full pseudocode in Appendix Section 9.
Theorem 5.2. With probability at least 1 − δ, in every epoch t ∈ [T ] such that fewer than
ε
4
⋅min⎛⎜⎜⎝ L8√2n ln(12mT /δ) − 1,
log(T )√n ln(320n2T /δ)
10ℓ
−√ ln(16dT /δ)
10
− 2 ln(320nT /δ)√ 5
n√
ln(320nT /δ)(1 + 20√
n
)
⎞⎟⎟⎠
changes have occurred in epochs 1,2, . . . , t,
∣fˆ t(v) −Pt(v)∣ < 4(log(T )+ 2)√2 ln(320n2T /δ)
ℓ
+
¿ÁÁÀ ln( 16ndTδ )
n
.
Proof Sketch: Our proof is similar to that of Theorem 4.3 and proceeds by proving analogous ver-
sions of the same lemmas, with users checking for changes in the subgroup distribution over ob-
served hashes rather than observed bits. This leads to one new wrinkle in our argument: once we
8
show that the globally estimated hash is close to the true hash, we must translate from closeness of
hashes to closeness of the distributions they induce (Lemma 9.4) . The rest of the proof, which uses
guarantees of user estimate accuracy to 1. guarantee that sufficiently large changes cause global
updates and 2. each change incurs a bounded privacy loss, largely follows that of Theorem 4.3. ◻
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6 Missing Proofs from Section 4
Theorem 6.1. The protocol THRESH satisfies ε-local differential privacy (Definition 2.1)
Proof. To begin, we fix an arbitrary private user i and arbitrary algorithms A′−i,C′ for the other
users and for the center. Fix any pair of inputs xi, x′i for user i. To ease notation, let tr =
tri(Ai(xi),A′−i,C′) and tr′ = tri(Ai(x′i),A′−i,C′) be the random variables corresponding to the
messages sent by user i in the protocol with inputs xi, x′i, respectively. Note that we drop the sub-
script i, since user i will be fixed throughout. To prove the theorem, it suffices to show
P [tr = z]
P [tr′ = z] ≤ eε
for every possible set of messages z.
The structure of the transcripts is as follows: each epoch t contributes two elements, first the vote
at (the output of VOTE(i, t)) and the estimate p˜t (the output of EST(i, t)). So we can write z =((a1, p˜1), . . . , (aT , p˜T )) and
P [tr = z]
P [tr′ = z] = T∏t=1 P [tr
t
= (at, p˜t) ∣ tr<t = z<t]
P [tr′t = (at, p˜t) ∣ tr′<t = z<t] .
For any execution of the protocol, we can partition the set of epochs into those epochs SV ⊆ [T ]
where in at least one of tr and tr′ user i sets VoteYesti to True, and those ScV where VoteYesti is False
in both tr and tr′; similarly, we can partition [T ] into those epochs SE where SendEstimateti is True
in at least one of tr and tr′ and those ScE where SendEstimateti is False in both tr and tr′.
Since every epoch in SV causes the counter cvi to increase by a, SV contains at most ε/4a epochs
from each of tr and tr′, so ∣SV ∣ ≤ ε/2a.
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For any t ∈ ScV , user i will sample a
t and p˜t from Ber( 1
ea+1) in both tr and tr′. Thus
∏
t∈Sc
V
P [trt = (at, p˜t) ∣ tr<t = z<t]
P [tr′t = (at, p˜t) ∣ tr′<t = z<t] = 1.
To complete the proof, we need to bound
∏
t∈SV
P [trt = (at, p˜t) ∣ tr<t = z<t]
P [tr′t = (at, p˜t) ∣ tr′<t = z<t] ≤ eε/2,
which will hold because every factor in the product is at most ea and ∣SV ∣ ≤ ε/2a. To see why,
consider some epoch t ∈ SV . The first component of trt is the vote at ∈ {0,1}. The only two
possibilities for how at is chosen are at ∼ Ber( 1
ea+1) or at ∼ Ber( eaea+1). One can easily verify that
for any at ∈ {0,1},
P [at ∣ tr<t = z<t]
P [at ∣ tr′<t = z<t] ≤ ea.
We now consider the second component of trt, which is p˜t. As in the SV case, since every epoch in
SE causes the counter cEi to increase by b, SE contains at most ε/4b epochs from each of tr and tr′,
so ∣SE ∣ ≤ ε/2b.
When SendEstimatet is False, then p˜t is sampled from
Ber ( 1
eb + 1)
and when SendEstimatet is True, then p˜t is sampled from
Ber(1 + pˆt(eb − 1)
eb + 1 )
depending on the value of the private data pˆt, which lies in [0,1]. Thus, the parameter in the
Bernoulli distribution lies in [ 1
eb+1 , e
b
eb+1 ]. Again, one can easily verify that for any p˜t ∈ {0,1},
P [p˜t ∣ tr<t = z<t, at]
P [p˜t ∣ tr′<t = z<t, at] ≤ eb.
Putting it together, we have
P [tr = z]
P [tr′ = z] = T∏t=1 P [tr
t
= (at, p˜t) ∣ tr<t = z<t]
P [tr′t = (at, p˜t) ∣ tr′<t = z<t]
= ∏
t∈SV
P [trt = at ∣ tr<t = z<t]
P [tr′t = at ∣ tr′<t = z<t] ⋅ ∏t∈SE P [tr
t
= p˜t ∣ tr<t = z<t, at]
P [tr′t = p˜t) ∣ tr′<t = z<t, at]
≤ ea⋅∣SV ∣ ⋅ eb⋅∣SE ∣ ≤ eε/2 ⋅ eε/2 ≤= eε.
This completes the proof.
7 Missing Proofs From Section 4.2
We begin the proof of our accuracy guarantee with a series of lemmas. Recalling that we set
a =
4
√
2n ln(12mT /δ)
L − 3√
2
√
n ln(12mT /δ)
and
b =
√
2 ln(12T /δ)/2n
log(T )√ln(12nT /δ)/2ℓ−√ln(12T /δ)/2n
we start by showing that if every user votes that a change has not occurred, then a global update will
not occur.
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Lemma 7.1. With probability at least 1 − δ
6
, in every epoch t ∈ [T ], if every user i sets VoteYesti ←
False then GlobalUpdatet ← False.
Proof. Since every user i sets VoteYesti ← False, every ati is an iid draw from a Bern( 1ea+1) distri-
bution. Thus a Chernoff bound says
P
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1a
t
i − 1
ea + 1 ∣ ≥
√
ln(12T /δ)
2n
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤ δ6T .
Since GlobalUpdatet ← ( 1
n ∑ni=1 ati > 1ea+1 +√ ln(12T /δ)2n ), GlobalUpdatet ← False. Union-
bounding across T epochs completes the proof.
Similarly, we also want to ensure that if every user in some subgroup votes that an update has
occurred then a global update will indeed occur.
Lemma 7.2. With probability at least 1 − δ
3
, in every epoch t ∈ [T ], if there is a subgroup j where
every user i ∈ Sj sets VoteYes
t
i ← True then GlobalUpdatet ← True.
Proof. Since ∣Sj ∣ ≥ L, Chernoff bounds imply that the aggregate vote satisfies
1
n
n∑
i=1a
t
i >
1
n
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ Le
a
ea + 1 −
√
L ln(12mT /δ)
2
+ n −L
ea + 1 −
√(n −L) ln(12mT /δ)
2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Recalling that GlobalUpdatet ← True if and only if 1
n ∑ni=1 ati > 1ea+1 +√ ln(12T /δ)2n , it suffices to
show that
1
n
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣ Le
a
ea + 1 −
√
L ln(12mT /δ)
2
+ n −L
ea + 1 −
√(n −L) ln(12mT /δ)
2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ > 1ea + 1 +
√
ln(12T /δ)
2n
.
Rearranging, it is enough to show that
L >
3√
2
⋅ ea + 1
ea − 1 ⋅√n ln(12mT /δ)
and using the fact that e
a
+1
ea−1
<
a+2
a
it is enough that
a >
3
√
2n ln(12mT /δ)
L − 3√
2
√
n ln(12mT /δ)
which follows from our setting of a. Union-bounding acrossm subgroups and T epochs completes
the proof.
We now show that every user in every epoch obtains an estimate pˆti of µ
t
g(i) of bounded inaccuracy.
This will enable us to—among other things—guarantee that users do not send “false positive" votes.
Lemma 7.3. With probability at least 1 − δ
6
, in each epoch t ∈ [T ] each user i has
∣pˆti − µtg(i)∣ <√ ln(12nT /δ)2ℓ .
Proof. E [pˆti] = µtg(i), so by an additive Chernoff bound
P
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣∣pˆti − µtg(i)∣ ≥
√
ln(12nT /δ)
2ℓ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤ 2 exp
⎛⎜⎝−2
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
√
ln(12nT /δ)
2ℓ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
2
ℓ
⎞⎟⎠ = δ/6nT.
A union bound across n users and T epochs then completes the proof.
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Next, in those epochs in which a global update occurs and no user i has hit their estimation privacy
cap cEi , in the interest of asymptotic optimality we want to obtain a similar error for the resulting
collated estimate p˜t.
Lemma 7.4. With probability at least 1 − δ
3
, in every epoch t ∈ [T ] where every user i sets
SendEstimateti ← True, ∣pt − p˜t∣ < 2(log(T )+ 2)√ ln(12nT /δ)
2ℓ
.
Proof. Since every user i sets SendEstimateti ← True we know that for all i
p˜ti ∼ Ber(1 + pˆti(eb − 1)
eb + 1 ) ,
so
E [p˜t] = E[ 1
n
n∑
i=1
p˜ti(eb + 1) − 1
eb − 1 ] = 1n n∑i=1 E [p˜
t
i] (eb + 1) − 1
eb − 1 = 1n n∑i=1 pˆti.
Since p˜t is an average of { −1
eb−1
, e
b
eb−1
}-valued random variables, we transform it into the {0,1}-
valued random variable
Y = (p˜t + 1
eb − 1) ⋅ eb − 1eb + 1 .
Applying an additive Chernoff bound as above yields
P
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣∣Y −E [Y ]∣ ≥
√
ln(12T /δ)
2n
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤ δ6T
which implies that
P
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣∣p˜t − 1n
n∑
i=1 pˆ
t
i∣ ≥ (eb + 1
eb − 1)
√
ln(12T /δ)
2n
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤ δ6T .
Similarly, as E [ 1
n ∑ni=1 pˆti] = pt,
P
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1 pˆ
t
i − pt∣ ≥√ ln(12T /δ)
2n
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤ δ6T .
Combining these results in the triangle inequality yields that with probability at least 1 − δ
6T
∣p˜t − pt∣ < 2(eb + 1
eb − 1)
√
ln(12T /δ)
2n
.
Since e
b
+1
eb−1
<
b+2
b
, this implies that
∣p˜t − pt∣ < 2(b + 2
b
)√ ln(12T /δ)
2n
so to get
∣p˜t − pt∣ < 2(log(T )+ 2)√ ln(12nT /δ)
2ℓ
it is enough for
b >
√
2 ln(12T /δ)/n(log(T )+ 2)√ln(12nT /δ)/2ℓ−√ln(12T /δ)/2n.
Substituting in our setting of
b =
√
2 ln(12T /δ)/2n
log(T )√ln(12nT /δ)/2ℓ−√ln(12T /δ)/2n
and union-bounding over T epochs completes the proof.
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Finally, we use the above lemmas to reason about how long users’ privacy budgets last. We’ll first
define a useful term for this claim.
Definition 7.5. We say a change ∆t occurs in epoch t ∈ [T ] if there exists subgroup j such that
µtj ≠ µ
t−1
j . Given changes ∆t1 and ∆t2 where t1 < t2, we say that ∆t1 and ∆t2 are adjacent
changes if there does not exist a change∆t3 such that t1 < t3 < t2.
This lets us prove the following lemma bounding the frequency of global updates.
Lemma 7.6. With probability at least 1−δ, given adjacent changes∆t1 and∆t2 , GlobalUpdatet ←
True in at most one epoch t ∈ [t1, t2).
Proof. First, with probability at least 1 − δ all of the preceding lemma in this section apply, and we
condition on them for the remainder of this proof.
Assume instead that GlobalUpdatet ← True and GlobalUpdatet′ ← True as well for t1 ≤ t < t′ ≤
t2 − 1, and that GlobalUpdatet3 ← False for all t3 ∈ (t, t′). Recall that by Lemma 7.1, if in epoch t′
every user i sets VoteYest
′
i ← False then
1
n
n∑
i=1a
t′
i ≤
1
ea + 1 +
√
ln(12T /δ)
2n
which means GlobalUpdatet
′ ← False. Therefore since we know GlobalUpdatet′ ← True, it follows
that at least one user i sets VoteYest
′
i ← True. By the thresholding structure of THRESH, this implies
that ∣pˆt′i − pˆti∣ > 2√ ln(12nT /δ)
2ℓ
.
Since Lemma 7.3 guarantees that both pˆt
′
i and pˆ
t
i are within
√
ln(12nT /δ)
2ℓ
of µt
′
g(i) and µtg(i) re-
spectively, it follows that µt
′
g(i) ≠ µtg(i). This contradicts the fact that ∆t1 and ∆t2 were adjacent
changes.
We similarly bound the frequency with which users vote that a change has occurred.
Lemma 7.7. With probability at least 1− δ, given adjacent changes∆t1 and∆t2 such that a global
update occurs in t3 ∈ [t1, t2), for each user i there is at most one epoch t ∈ (t3, t2) where VoteYesti ←
True.
Proof. First, with probability at least 1− δ all of the preceding lemmas in this section apply, and we
condition on them for the remainder of this proof. In particular, Lemma 7.6 implies that t3 is the
only epoch in [t1, t2) in which a global update occurs.
For contradiction, let t3 < t4 < t5 < t2 and assume that user i sets VoteYes
t4
i ← True and VoteYest5i ←
True. Since there is only one t ∈ [T − 1] such that 2⌊log(T )⌋−1 divides t, and the construction of the
Vote subroutine requires this for a user m to set VoteYestm ← True, without loss of generality we
may suppose that ∣pˆt4i − pˆf(t4)i ∣ > Tb and ∣pˆt5i − pˆf(t5)i ∣ > Tb′ where b > b′ ≥ 1. However, Lemma 7.3
then implies that every userm in Sg(i) has ∣pˆt5m − pˆf(t5)i ∣ > T ′b, so by Lemma 7.6 GlobalUpdatet5 ←
True, a contradiction of t3 being the only epoch in [t1, t2) in which a global update occurs.
Our last lemma before our main theorem ties the above results together to relate changes to increases
in users’ privacy caps ci. This will eventually let us lower bound the time for which THRESH outputs
accurate results.
Lemma 7.8. Denote by cti the value of ci in epoch t. Then with probability at least 1 − δ, across all
epochs, given any two adjacent changes∆t1 and∆t2 , for every user i
ct2−1i,E ≤ c
t1−1
i,E + 1
and
ct2−1i,V ≤ c
t1−1
i,V + 2.
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Proof. First, with probability at least 1− δ all of the preceding lemmas in this section apply, and we
condition on them for the remainder of this proof.
Fix a user i. First, ci,E increases in any epoch t where SendEstimateti ← True. This only happens in
epoch where GlobalUpdatet ← True, and by Lemma 7.6, at most one global update occurs in epochs
in [t1, t2), so ct2−1i,E ≤ ct1−1i,E + 1. We analyze ci,V in two cases.
Case 1: For all t ∈ [t1, t2), GlobalUpdatet ← False. Here, since no global update occurs, if ct2−1i,V >
ct1i + 2 then there must exist 3 epochs t ∈ [t1, t2) where user i sets VoteYesti ← True, a contradiction
of Lemma 7.7.
Case 2: For some epoch t∗ ∈ [t1, t2), GlobalUpdatet∗ ← True. It then suffices to show that user i
sets VoteYesti ← True in at most two epochs t ∈ [t1, t2 − 1] (possibly including t∗).
Assume instead that VoteYest3i , VoteYes
t4
i , and VoteYes
t5
i ← True for distinct t3, t4, t5 ∈ [t1, t2).
By Lemmas 7.3 and 7.4, VoteYesti ← False in any epoch t ∈ [t∗ + 1, t2). Therefore t3, t4, t5 ∈[t1, t∗], and at least two are in [t1, t∗ − 1] and do not trigger a global update. This again contradicts
Lemma 7.7.
Taken together, these preliminary results let us prove our main accuracy theorem.
Theorem 7.9. With probability at least 1 − δ, in every epoch t ∈ [T ] such that fewer than
ε
4
⋅min⎛⎝ L8√2n ln(12mT /δ) − 1, 1√2 [log(T )
√
n
ℓ
− 1]⎞⎠
changes have occurred in epochs 1,2, . . . , t,
∣p˜t − pt∣ ≤ 4(⌊log(T )⌋ + 2)√ ln(12nT /δ)
2ℓ
.
Proof. First, with probability at least 1−δ all of the preceding lemmas and corollaries in this section
apply, and we condition on them for the remainder of this proof. In particular, since
min( ε
8a
,
ε
4b
) = ε
4
⋅min( 1
2a
,
1
b
)
=
ε
4
⋅min⎛⎜⎝L −
3√
2
√
n ln(12mT /δ)
8
√
2n ln(12mT /δ) , log(T )
√
ln(12nT /δ)/2ℓ−√ln(12T /δ)/2n√
2 ln(12T /δ)/2n ⎞⎟⎠
>
ε
4
⋅min⎛⎝ L8√2n ln(12mT /δ) − 1, 1√2 [log(T )
√
n
ℓ
− 1]⎞⎠
we know that the number of changes thus far is less thanmin ( ε
8a
, ε
4b
), and by Lemma 7.8 for every
user i, cVi < ε/4 and cEi < ε/4, i.e. no user has exceeded their voting or estimation privacy budget.
Now suppose for contradiction that
∣p˜t − pt∣ > 4(⌊log(T )⌋ + 2)√ ln(12nT /δ)
2ℓ
.
By Lemma 7.4 this means GlobalUpdatet ← False, so by Lemma 7.2 for every subgroup j ∈ [m]
there exists user i ∈ Sj such that
∣pˆti − pˆf(t)i ∣ ≤ 2(⌊log(T )⌋+ 1)√ ln(12nT /δ)2ℓ .
Lemma 7.3 then implies that
∣µtj − µf(t)j ∣ ≤ 2(⌊log(T )⌋+ 2)√ ln(12nT /δ)2ℓ .
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Since this holds for every subgroup j, we get that
∣pt − pf(t)∣ ≤ 2(⌊log(T )⌋+ 2)√ ln(12nT /δ)
2ℓ
,
and since GlobalUpdatet ← False, by Lemma 7.4 this means that p˜t = p˜f(t) and
∣p˜t − pt∣ ≤ 4(⌊log(T )⌋ + 2)√ ln(12nT /δ)
2ℓ
.
a contradiction.
8 Missing Proofs from Section 5.2
We start with full pseudocode for HEAVYTHRESH.
Next, we prove a lemma guaranteeing the privacy of theR subroutine.
Lemma 8.1. R is ε-locally DP.
Proof. Choose a possible output z of R. Let h1 and h2 be two arbitrary input hashes. It suffices to
show
P [R(h1) = z]
P [R(h2) = z] ≤ eε.
Case 1: h1 and h2 are zero vectors. ThenR(h1) andR(h2) have identical output distributions and
the result is immediate.
Case 2: Exactly one (WLOG h1) hash is a nonzero vector. Then
P [R(h2) = z] = 1
2w
.
Similarly,
P [R(h1) = z] ≤ 1
w
⋅ (1
2
+ 1
2cε
) .
Therefore
P [R(h1) = z]
P [R(h2) = z] ≤ 1 + 1cε = 1 + eε − 1eε + 1 ≤ eε.
Case 3: Neither h1 nor h2 is a zero vector. Then by the logic above
P [R(h1) = z]
P [R(h2) = z] ≤ 1 +
eε−1
eε+1
1 − eε−1
eε+1
=
eε + 1 + eε − 1
eε + 1 − eε + 1 = eε.
9 Missing Proofs From Section 5.3
First, recall that we set
a =
4
√
2n ln(12mT /δ)
L − 3√
2
√
n ln(12mT /δ)
and
b =
2(√ ln(16wT /δ)
nw
+ ln(16wT /δ)√w
n2
)
2(log(T )+ 2)√2 ln(16wnT /δ)
wℓ
− 2√ ln(16dT /δ)
2wn
− ln(16wT /δ)√w
n2
We start with a result aboutR.
Lemma 9.1. For all ǫ > 0 and x ∈ [− 1√
w
, 1√
w
]w, E [R(x, ε)] = x.
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Algorithm 4 Global Algorithm: HEAVYTHRESH
Require: number of users n, number of epochs T , minimum subgroup size L, number of subgroups
m, epoch length ℓ, privacy parameter ε, failure parameter δ
1: Initialize global estimate y˜0 ← −1
2: Initialize update counters c1, . . . , cn ← 0,0, . . . ,0
3: Initialize vote noise level a← 4√2n ln(12mT /δ)
L− 3√
2
√
n ln(12mT /δ)
4: Initialize estimate noise level b← 2(√ ln(16wT /δ)nw + ln(16wT /δ)√wn2 )
2(log(T )+2)√2 ln(16wnT /δ)
wℓ
−2
√
ln(16dT /δ)
2wn
−
ln(16wT /δ)√w
n2
5: w ← 20n
6: Initialize JL matrix Φ ← GenProj(w,d)
7: for each epoch t ∈ [T ] do
8: for each user i ∈ [n] do
9: User i publishes ati ← HEAVYVOTE(i, t)
10: end for
11: GlobalUpdatet ← ( 1
n ∑ni=1 ati > 1ea+1 +√ ln(16T /δ)2n )
12: if GlobalUpdatet then
13: f(t) ← t
14: for each i ∈ [n] do
15: User i publishes z˜ti ← HEAVYEST(i, t)
16: end for
17: Aggregate user estimates into global estimate:
y˜t ← 1
n ∑ni=1 z˜ti
18: else
19: f(t) ← f(t − 1)
20: for each i ∈ [n] do
21: User i publishes z˜ti ←R(0, b)
22: end for
23: y˜t ← y˜t−1
24: end if
25: Analyst publishes y˜t
26: Analyst publishes FOt ← (Φ, y˜t)
27: end for
Algorithm 5 Local Subroutine: HEAVYVOTE
Require: user i, epoch t
1: Compute local estimate pˆti ← 1ℓ ∑tℓr=(t−1)ℓ+1 vri
2: Compute local hash yˆti ← Φpˆti
3: b∗ ← highest b such that ∣∣yˆti − yˆf(t)i ∣∣∞ > τb
4: VoteYesti ← (cVi < ε/4a and 2⌊logT ⌋−b∗ divides t)
5: if VoteYesti then
6: cVi ← cVi + a
7: ati ← Ber( eaea+1)
8: else
9: ati ← Ber( 1ea+1)
10: end if
11: Output ati
Algorithm 6 Frequency Oracle: AFO
Require: Frequency oracle (Φ, 1
n ∑ni=1 zi), dictionary value to be estimated v ∈ [d]
1: Output fˆ(v) = ⟨Φev, z¯⟩
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Algorithm 7 Local Subroutine: HEAVYEST
Require: user i, epoch t
1: SendEstimateti ← {cEi < ε/4b}
2: if SendEstimateti then
3: ci ← cEi + b
4: z˜ti ←R(yˆti , b)
5: else
6: z˜ti ←R(0, b)
7: end if
8: Output z˜ti
Algorithm 8 Client Randomizer: R
Require: Hashed histogram h = Φpˆti, privacy parameter ε
1: Sample j ∈ [w] uniformly at random
2: cε ← eb+1eb−1
3: z ← 0 ∈ Rw
4: if h ≠ 0 then
5: Draw x ∼ Uni(0,1)
6: if x < 1
2
+ hj√w
2cε
then
7: zj ← cε√w
8: else
9: zj ← −cε√w
10: end if
11: else
12: zj ← cε√w or − cε√w u.a.r
13: end if
14: Output z
Proof. In the case where x = 0, we get
E [R(x)]j = 1w ⋅ (−cε
√
w
2
+ cε√w
2
) = 0,
and for x ≠ 0
E [R(x)]j = 1w [(12 + xj
√
w
2cε
) cε√w + (1
2
− xj√w
2cε
)(−cε√w)] = xj .
Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2, since they cover portions of the voting process shared between VOTE and
HEAVYVOTE, apply here with only their failure probabilities changed to δ/8 and δ/4. We start with
an analogue of Lemma 7.3.
Lemma 9.2. With probability at least 1 − δ
8
, for every epoch t and user i, defining by pt
g(i) the
d-dimensional vector where pt
g(i)(q) = Ptg(i)(q),
∥Φpˆti −Φptg(i)∥
∞
<
√
2 ln(16wnT /δ)
wℓ
.
Proof. Φpˆti is a vector with entries in ± 1√w , so settingX = √w(Φpˆti+ 1√w )2 we getX ∈ [0,1]m where
each index Xj has E [Xj] = √w((Φptg(i))j+ 1√w )2 . A Chernoff bound then says that, with probability
at least 1 − δ
8
, for every user i and every epoch t
∥X −E [Xj]∥
∞
<
√
ln(16wnT /δ)
2ℓ
.
Scaling this result by 2√
w
and transformingX back into Φpˆti yields the claim.
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This brings us to an analogue of Lemma 7.4.
Lemma 9.3. With probability at least 1 − 3δ
8
, for every epoch t where every user i sets
SendEstimateti ← True,
∥y˜t −Φpt∥
∞
< 2(log(T )+ 2)√2 ln(16wnT /δ)
wℓ
.
Proof. By Lemma 9.1, E [y˜t] = 1
n ∑ni=1Φpˆti, and we want to begin by bounding ∥y˜t − 1n ∑ni=1Φpˆti∥.
First, since each of the n random variables zˆti that make up y˜
t
=
1
n ∑ni=1 zˆti is a zero vector except for
an independently randomly chosen index s ∈ [w], for each s ∈ [w] we can bound the numberN tj of
vectors zˆti that are nonzero in index s by an additive Chernoff bound:
P
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣N ts > nw +
√
n ln(8wT /δ)
2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤ δ8wT .
Union bounding over w indices, since y˜t is normalized by 1/n, we get that
y˜t ∈
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣−cε
√
w
⎛⎝ 1w +
√
ln(8wT /δ)
2n
⎞⎠ , cε√w⎛⎝ 1w +
√
ln(8wT /δ)
2n
⎞⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
w
.
Thus scaling, applying a Chernoff bound to each index, then re-scaling and union bounding over
all w indices and T epochs gives us that with probability at least 1 − δ
8
in every epoch t where
GlobalUpdatet ← True
∥y˜t − 1
n
n∑
i=1Φpˆ
t
i∥
∞
< 2cε
⎛⎝ 1w +
√
ln(8wT /δ)
2n
⎞⎠
√
w ln(16wT /δ)
2n
< cε
⎛⎝
√
2 ln(16wT /δ)
wn
+ ln(16T /δ)√w
n
⎞⎠ .
Similarly,
∥Φpt − 1
n
n∑
i=1Φpˆ
t
i∥
∞
= ∥Φ∥
∞
⋅ ∥pt − 1
n
n∑
i=1 pˆ
t
i∥
∞
≤
1√
w
⋅√ ln(16dT /δ)
2n
=
√
ln(16dT /δ)
2wn
where the inequality holds with probability at least 1 − δ
8
in every epoch t by the definition of Φ
and a Chernoff bound on the sampling error of n samples from Pt, union bounded over d dictionary
elements and T epochs. By triangle inequality,
∥y˜t −Φpt∥
∞
< cε
⎛⎝
√
ln(16wT /δ)
nw
+ ln(16wT /δ)√w
n
⎞⎠ +
√
ln(16dT /δ)
2wn
andsince cε =
eb+1
eb−1
<
b+2
b
, it is enough to set b such that
b + 2
b
⎛⎝
√
ln(16wT /δ)
nw
+ ln(16wT /δ)√w
n
⎞⎠+
√
ln(16dT /δ)
2wn
≤ 2(log(T )+2)√2 ln(16wnT /δ)
wℓ
.
Substituting in our value
b =
2(√ ln(16wT /δ)
nw
+ ln(16wT /δ)√w
n2
)
2(log(T )+ 2)√2 ln(16wnT /δ)
wℓ
− 2√ ln(16dT /δ)
2wn
− ln(16wT /δ)√w
n2
yields the claim.
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We’ll need the following result to translate bounds on ∥y˜t −Φpt∥ into accuracy bounds relative toPt.
Lemma 9.4. With probability at least 1 − δ
8
, in every epoch t if
∥y˜t −Φpt∥
∞
< B
then, denoting by fˆ t the frequency oracle induced by (Φ, y˜t),
max
v∈[d] ∣fˆ t(v) −Pt(v)∣ ≤ B√w + 2
√
ln(16ndT /δ)
n
.
Proof. The outline of our proof is similar (and in some steps identical) to that of Theorem 2.5
in Bassily and Smith [3], but we provide it here for completeness. First,
max
v∈[d] ∣fˆ t(v) −Pt(v)∣ = maxv∈[d] ∣⟨y˜t,Φev⟩ − ⟨pt, ev⟩∣
= max
v∈[d] ∣⟨y˜t −Φpt,Φev⟩ + ⟨Φpt,Φev⟩ − ⟨pt, ev⟩∣
≤ max
v∈[d] ∣⟨y˜t −Φpt,Φev⟩∣ +maxv∈[d] ∣⟨Φpt,Φev⟩ − ⟨pt, ev⟩∣ .
Then by Corollary 6.4 from Blum et al. [7], since γ =
√
ln(16ndT /δ)
n
and w = 20n = 20 ln(16ndT /δ)
γ2
,
we get that with probability at least 1 − δ
8T
we can bound the second term by
max
v∈[d] ∣⟨Φpt,Φev⟩ − ⟨pt, ev⟩∣ ≤ γ (∥pt∥22 + ∥ev∥22) ≤ 2γ.
By our assumption we can bound the first term by∥y˜t −Φpt∥
∞
⋅ ∥Φev∥1 ≤ B√w.
Together with a union bound over the T epochs, these yield the claim.
We can use these lemmas to prove an analogue of Corollary 7.6. First, we specify our setting-specific
redefinition of change.
Definition 9.5. We say a change ∆t occurs in epoch t ∈ [T ] if there exists subgroup j ∈ [m] such
that Ptj ≠ Pt−1j .
This lets us state the necessary result.
Lemma 9.6. With probability at least 1−δ, given adjacent changes∆t1 and∆t2 , GlobalUpdatet ←
True in at most one epoch t ∈ [t1, t2).
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Lemma 7.6, only replacing Lemma 7.3 with Lemma 9.2.
Lemmas 7.7 and 7.8 apply in this setting unmodified, which finally lets us prove the following
accuracy guarantee.
Theorem 9.7 (Accuracy Guarantee). With probability at least 1−δ, in every epoch t ∈ [T ] such that
fewer than
ε
4
⋅min⎛⎜⎜⎝ L8√2n ln(12mT /δ) − 1,
log(T )√n ln(320n2T /δ)
10ℓ
−√ ln(16dT /δ)
10
− 2 ln(320nT /δ)√ 5
n√
ln(320nT /δ)(1 + 20√
n
)
⎞⎟⎟⎠
changes have occurred in epochs 1,2, . . . , t,
∣fˆ t(v) −Pt(v)∣ < 4(log(T )+ 2)√2 ln(320n2T /δ)
ℓ
+
¿ÁÁÀ ln( 16ndTδ )
n
.
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Proof. The proof is nearly identical to that of Theorem 4.3, replacing all lemmas with their heavy-
hitter analogues proven above. We provide it here for completeness.
First, with probability at least 1− δ all of the preceding lemmas and corollaries in this section apply,
and we condition on them for the remainder of this proof. In particular, since
min( ε
8a
,
ε
4b
) = ε
4
⋅min( 1
2a
,
1
b
)
=
ε
4
⋅min⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
L − 3√
2
√
n ln(12mT /δ)
8
√
2n ln(12mT /δ) , 2(log(T )+ 2)
√
2 ln(16wnT /δ)
wℓ
− 2√ ln(16dT /δ)
2wn
− ln(16wT /δ)√w
n2
2(√ ln(16wT /δ)
nw
+ ln(16wT /δ)√w
n2
)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
>
ε
4
⋅min⎛⎜⎝ L8√2n ln(12mT /δ) − 316 , (log(T )+ 2)
√
2 ln(320n2T /δ)
20nℓ
−√ ln(16dT /δ)
40n2
− ln(320nT /δ)√20n
n2√
ln(320nT /δ)( 1
n
+ 20
n3/2 )
⎞⎟⎠
=
ε
4
⋅min⎛⎜⎜⎝ L8√2n ln(12mT /δ) − 316 ,
(log(T )+ 2)√n ln(320n2T /δ)
10ℓ
− 1
2
√
ln(16dT /δ)
10
− 2 ln(320nT /δ)√ 5
n√
ln(320nT /δ)(1 + 20√
n
)
⎞⎟⎟⎠
>
ε
4
⋅min⎛⎜⎜⎝ L8√2n ln(12mT /δ) − 1,
log(T )√n ln(320n2T /δ)
10ℓ
−√ ln(16dT /δ)
10
− 2 ln(320nT /δ)√ 5
n√
ln(320nT /δ)(1 + 20√
n
)
⎞⎟⎟⎠
we know that the number of changes thus far is less thanmin ( ε
8a
, ε
4b
), and by Lemma 7.8 for every
user i, cVi < ε/4 and cEi < ε/4, i.e. no user has exceeded their voting or estimation privacy budget.
Now suppose for contradiction that in epoch t
∣Φpt − y˜t−1∣ > 4(log(T ) + 2)√2 ln(16wnT /δ)
wℓ
.
By Lemma 9.3 this means GlobalUpdatet ← False, so by Lemma 7.2 for every subgroup j ∈ [m]
there exists user i ∈ Sj such that
∣∣Φpˆti −Φpˆf(t)i ∣∣∞ ≤ 2(log(T )+ 1)√2 ln(16wnT /δ)wℓ .
Lemma 9.2 then implies that
∣∣Φptg(i) −Φpf(t)g(i) ∣∣∞ ≤ 2(log(T )+ 2)
√
2 ln(16wnT /δ)
wℓ
.
Since this holds for every subgroup j, we get that
∣∣Φpt −Φpf(t)∣∣∞ ≤ 2(log(T )+ 2)√2 ln(16wnT /δ)
wℓ
,
and since GlobalUpdatet ← False, by Lemma 9.3 this means that y˜t = y˜f(t), so
∣∣y˜t −Φpt∣∣∣∞ ≤ 2(log(T )+ 2)√2 ln(16wnT /δ)
wℓ
.
Plugging this quantity into Lemma 9.4 as B gives that for all v ∈ [d]
∣fˆ t(v) −Pt(v)∣ < 2(log(T )+ 2)√2 ln(16wnT /δ)
ℓ
+
¿ÁÁÀ ln( 16ndTδ )
n
.
Substituting w = 20n yields the claim.
21
